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5d. Perspective on
Antel. Environ.*

25 March 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR : Director, PRG/IC

SUBJECT : Perspectives for Intelligence Planning

For the intelligence problems in which I have either an interest or competence, the draft is too general to have much relevance to intelligence planning that I could propose as we look into the next decade. I realize that the draft may have relevance to important and hard decisions about the allocation of significant resources to strategic intelligence objectives. Stated another way, it is my impression that a world outlook of this type is useful regarding strategic intelligence problems. Most other intelligence problems are regional in character and require a look at the future of the world region by region.

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James H. Critchfield
/ NIO/Energy

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DCI/IC 74-0614

22 March 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: NIO/Energy

SUBJECT: Perspectives for Intelligence Planning

1. The Director has asked that this document be updated to project-as we see it now-the environment in which the US Intelligence Community can be expected to operate during the remainder of this decade. The attached draft attempts to respond to his directive that it be future oriented and track with NIE judgments. He does not want a long and discursive paper, and has indicated that the length and outline of this draft are about right.

2. For your information, this will be Part I of Colby's "Perspectives" paper. He wants this part to point as specifically as possible to the developments during the next several years that are going to require new or improved intelligence capabilities. In Part II he can then identify in a broad sense the activities which he expects the Intelligence Community to take.

3. The DCI has asked that the NIOs critique this draft with the hope that he can turn to it again shortly after his return. We are prepared to proceed in whichever manner is more convenient for each NIO. While your written changes would be most helpful, if you prefer to discuss your suggestions orally with us, we will then endeavor to incorporate them in a redraft. [REDACTED] is prepared to undertake this task.

4. Either way, we hope we can hear from you before COB 27 March.

[REDACTED]
Director/ PRG/IC

Attachment

cc: D/DCI/NIO
[REDACTED]

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I. TRENDS IN THE WORLD SITUATION

A. The Great Power Adversaries

1. Relations among the world's major powers are shifting into new and sometimes novel configurations. Tensions between the US and each of its two principal adversaries, the USSR and China, are easing, and the character of the relationship between East and West in Europe is changing in a perhaps fundamental way. At the same time, the cold war between China and the Soviet Union shows little or no promise of imminent thaw, and partly because of the improving climate of relations between the two superpowers, ties between the US and Western Europe have begun to fray.

2. Few matters of importance in world affairs will arise in the 1970s which will not be affected by the state of relations between the US, the USSR, and China. Two basic circumstances will shape the course of these relations: the USSR's progress in achieving strategic parity with the US, and the course of the military confrontation between China and the Soviet Union in Asia. Recently these factors have combined in various ways to reinforce the trend in both Moscow and Peking toward policies of detente vis-a-vis the West. Specifically, for example, the desire of each Communist power to prevent the other from gaining relatively greater favor with Washington has encouraged

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both to proceed with some restraint vis-a-vis the US, even in the face of strong US initiatives. This competition is expected to continue.

3. Moscow's intentions and motivations in the areas of strategic arms limitation and mutual and balanced force reduction will continue to defy easy assessment. On the one hand the Soviets apparently will adhere to an overall foreign policy aimed at far-reaching detente with the US and its allies. On the other hand Moscow can be expected to pursue vigorously weapons development programs that portend substantial improvements in Soviet military capabilities. Indeed the qualitative advances in prospect for Soviet strategic offensive forces, coupled with improvements in Soviet strategic defenses, could enable the USSR to gain a decisive advantage over the US.

4. Acute Sino-Soviet hostility and the degree of restraint vis-a-vis the West which is encouraged by that hostility are not necessarily fixed elements in the three-power relationship. The Chinese are obviously devoting much energy to increasing their military defenses vis-a-vis the Soviet Union; and Chinese nuclear power is reaching a level precluding any rational Soviet decision to resort to military action against Peking. It is possible that, independently of developments in the military sphere, the post-Mao (and perhaps post-Chou) regime in Peking will seek a lessening of Sino-Soviet tension. Chances of a fundamental reconciliation between

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China and the USSR seem remote as long as the Soviets show no inclination to reduce their military forces along the Chinese border. A limited improvement in relations is unlikely in and of itself to significantly affect either power's attitude toward detente.

B. The US and Other Major Power Centers

5. The evolving pattern of relations among the three great powers, the climate of detente in East-West relations, and the growth of a general sense of West European self-assertiveness will continue to thrust another major power center, Western Europe, into the area of prime intelligence interest. The Europeans are likely to be increasingly preoccupied with their own Community concerns, less agitated about the Soviet military threat (at least in the near and mid-term), and will pursue their own national interests (both economic and political) with less regard for those of the US and sometimes for those of the Atlantic Community as a whole. Events which exacerbate their apprehension about the durability of the US commitment to Europe and increase their suspicions of US motives vis-a-vis the USSR will reinforce tendencies to pursue the concept of a common West European defense system. Severe problems on the economic front such as inflation and access to energy will complicate the process of reaching agreement on Community policies. Popular pressures on already weakened governments are unlikely to reinforce those otherwise

disposed toward finding solutions in a broader Atlantic context.

6. Moreover, serious issues will attend the development of detente in Europe. The West Europeans--though suspicious of ultimate Soviet intentions--will endeavor to expand economic relations with the USSR and Eastern Europe and to achieve a general political relaxation in Europe. Thus, in the era of Ostpolitik, the cohesion and effectiveness of NATO are by no means assured. The Soviets, while continuing to seek credits and technology in the West, will not sacrifice their dominance in the East for the sake of detente. The East Europeans, particularly the Romanians, will be torn between their hopes for the kind of greater autonomy East-West rapprochement could bring and their fears that the West might, in the name of detente, concede to Moscow the permanent right to rule its own sphere in Eastern Europe.

7. Elsewhere, Japan, like Western Europe, will move further away from its close association with the US and become a factor of even greater consequence in world affairs. It will continue to play an important worldwide economic role, a gradually growing political role in Asia, and a special economic and political role vis-a-vis both China and the USSR. Smaller states aligned with the US, including Canada, Australia, and several key Latin American countries, are likely to become even more self-reliant and less inclined to follow the US lead.

C. Turbulence in the Third World

8. The evolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Soviet role in the Middle East will remain major concerns of the US for some time to come. US attention is now focused on the development of a peace settlement, Arab use of oil resources as a political weapon, and the supply of arms and technology to the Arabs, particularly from the USSR and France.

9. The Soviets probably will not jeopardize Middle East peace negotiations since these offer at minimum the reopening of the Suez Canal. In economic terms the Soviets will benefit substantially from this development. In the Indian Ocean a gradual increase at least in the Soviet Naval presence is expected, and the Soviets will be better able to make surge deployments in local crises. Yet the Soviets will be apprehensive about the potential loss of influence in the aftermath of a settlement. They will continue to use military aid to preserve that influence and also, in some cases, to gain access to naval and air support facilities.

10. It is unlikely that the fighting in Southeast Asia will cease before 1980, if then. All countries in the area face ongoing or latent insurgencies. Defeat by insurgents of the forces of the incumbent governments--especially those of South Vietnam, Thailand, and the Philippines--could have serious consequences for US interests.

Elsewhere, in the Third World, the large non-aligned countries, such as India and Indonesia, and the strategically located states, such as Somalia and Singapore, will continue to attract Soviet interest and, where Moscow finds it feasible, a Soviet presence. Competition in these areas with the US and in some instances China will persist and perhaps grow.

11. South Asia, Latin America, and southern Africa (where black- and white-dominated nations confront each other) are all areas where eruptions are possible and where US interests may be involved. In South Asia, the situation in Pakistan and the relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan remains unsettled. And in Latin America, the USSR's military presence in the Caribbean and its influence in Peru and the emergence of increasingly nationalistic and often anti-US regimes pose potentially acute problems for the US. In the Balkans, the passing of Tito might tempt the Soviets to try to return Yugoslavia to the orthodox Communist fold.

D. Emerging Worldwide Problems

12. New kinds of international problems--such as the pace of technological change--and fresh perceptions of some old problems--such as the availability of vital natural resources and the overall impact of environmental pollution--demand, inter alia, the collection of new categories of information. Certain specific developments in recent

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Remarks: Attached is a copy of the revised draft "Perspectives" paper. [redacted] you and each Group Chief have copies. No distribution has been made outside of IC. [redacted] is planning to have a brainstorming session with the Group Cgiefs next Tuesday or Wednesday to discuss proposals to be added as specific guidance items at Part III where the text indicates such are to be inserted. I know you will be on leave then, but thought the Group Chiefs needed a little time to get ideas together (which is why I did not propose Monday.)					
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DCI PERSPECTIVES FOR INTELLIGENCE PLANNING

INTRODUCTION

1. This statement of perspectives for planning presents an overview of the major demands which will confront the US Intelligence Community during the next several years. It identifies areas in which redirection or changes in emphasis are anticipated, and indicates the actions which are to be taken.

2. Current-year guidance is provided by the "Key Intelligence Questions" and the program for their evaluation, by the DCI's memorandum of 6 September 1973 on "Objectives for the Intelligence Community," which the President has approved, and by the DCI's "National Foreign Intelligence Program Management Objectives for FY 1974," dated 14 December 1973, which was issued after consultation with the Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee.

3. Part I, "Trends in the World Situation," is a projection of political/economic/military/technological developments which are expected to have an impact on the needs of important intelligence consumers to which the Community must respond.

4. Part II, "Intelligence Priorities," discusses the substantive priorities, by country, provided by the current Attachment to DCID 1/2 as planning guidance for the 1975-1979 period.

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5. Part III, "The Intelligence Imperatives," sets forth the action which the Intelligence Community must take and the programs it must support to respond to the international environment which is described in Parts I and II.

I. TRENDS IN THE WORLD SITUATION

A. The Great Power Adversaries

1. Relations among the world's major powers are shifting into new configurations. Tensions between the US and each of its two principal adversaries, the USSR and China, are easing, and the character of the rivalry between East and West in Europe is changing in a perhaps fundamental way. ~~Partly because of the improving climate of relations between the two superpowers,~~ *At the same time,* ties between the US and Western Europe are being frayed by the sometimes conflicting imperatives of Atlanticism and European unity. ~~At the same time,~~ *And* the cold war between China and the Soviet Union shows little or no promise of imminent thaw.
2. Few matters of importance in world affairs will arise in the 1970s which will not be affected by the state of relations between the US, the USSR, and China. In a climate of virulent Sino-Soviet tension, the desire of each Communist power to prevent the other from gaining relatively greater favor with Washington will encourage both to proceed with some restraint vis-a-vis the US. But acute Sino-Soviet hostility may not remain a fixed element of the three-power relationship. It is possible, for example, that Mao's death will ease the way in both Peking and Moscow toward accommodation, especially if either or both have been disappointed in their dealings with the US. To be sure, chances of a fundamental reconciliation seem very remote. But even a limited detente, ~~say~~ *and* a movement toward a less risky, more controlled form of competition, ~~in~~

(might prevent)
~~which differences were muted and~~ third parties ~~prevented~~ from
(counting on and) *(in this and other ways, it thus)*
~~exploiting Sino-Soviet cleavages.~~ could have important policy

implications for the US and much of the rest of the world as well.

3. ~~Inevitably~~ Moscow's attitudes toward agreements with
the West ^{on} ~~concerning~~ strategic arms limitations and mutual force
reductions are complex, tentative and no doubt mixed. The Soviets
^{probably} will wish to adhere to an overall policy of detente. But they will also
pursue a variety of ambitious weapons development programs *(of the sort)*
^{their} which portend substantial improvements in ~~Soviet military~~ capabilities. Indeed,
in the absence of a new agreement constraining ^a ~~the Soviet~~ strategic
buildup, the USSR is likely by the early 1980s to surpass US forces
(as currently programmed) in numbers of missile reentry vehicles,
^{to} increase its existing superiority in missile throw-weight, and ^{to} retain
its advantage in numbers of strategic missiles. It might over the same
period substantially improve its strategic defenses, perhaps by the
development of a laser air defense system. It simply remains to be
seen to what extent detente considerations will lead the USSR to moderate
its strategic programs or subject them to negotiated limitations.

4. The consequences of detente for Soviet foreign policy also
remain to be worked out. In Third World areas, the USSR will have to
decide, sometimes in reaction to local crises, how hard and at what
risk to push its interests in opposition to US policies. In Western Europe,
Moscow will have to balance its desire to reduce US influence against its
fears that West Germany might fill any resulting void. And in Eastern

Europe, it will have to weigh the danger that stability will be jeopardized in a period of reduced tensions and greater East-West contacts.

5. The degree of restraint the Chinese show toward the West will continue to reflect Peking's perceptions of the threat from the north. As China continues to expand its deployment of strategic weapons (MRBMs and IRBMs)--it already possesses the beginnings of a credible second-strike force--Peking's confidence in its deterrent strength will grow and its concern over a Soviet attack decline. ~~Thus~~ ^(anxiety to) ~~at least one incentive for~~ China's ~~maintaining~~ good relations with the West, and its willingness to implicitly sanction the US presence in parts of Asia, will perhaps diminish ~~as a~~ ^{as a consequence.}

6. ^{if} But the future of detente is ~~thus~~ ^{it} uncertain, ~~this is not to~~ ^{by no means certain} ~~say~~ that its foundations will ~~necessarily~~ crumble, even ~~(for example)~~ in the face of changes in the USSR's military posture and in the state of the Sino-Soviet relationship. The economic and technological needs and aspirations of both Communist powers and the impact of changes on the world economic scene on the US, among others, will continue to provide powerful incentives for reduced levels of tension ~~between the US and the USSR and the US and China.~~

B. The US and Other Major Power Centers

7. Long-established patterns of US-European relations are clearly in process of fundamental readjustment--brought on by the

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atmosphere of East-West detente and the strong belief in Europe itself that indefinite dependence on the US is neither desirable nor feasible. How this conviction will work itself out in practice--as between the impulse for European unity and the continuing need for Atlantic ties--will be a central question in the US-European relationship for years to come. The cohesion and effectiveness of NATO are ^(not) ^(in any event.) ~~by no means~~ assured. (affecting the Atlantic alliance) The issues, knotty enough in themselves, are likely to be exacerbated by Soviet efforts to exploit them and by a number of coincidental pressures arising from inflation and energy problems, the unhealthy political condition of many European governments, and disagreements within the European Community itself.

8. Important issues will also face the Soviet Bloc. Moscow, while continuing to seek credits and technology in the West, will not sacrifice its dominance in the East for the sake of detente. The East Europeans, particularly the Romanians, will be torn between their hopes for the kind of greater autonomy East-West rapprochement could bring and their fears that the West might, in the name of detente, concede to Moscow the permanent right to rule its own sphere in Eastern Europe. In the Balkans, the passing of Tito might tempt the Soviets to try to return Yugoslavia to the ~~orthodox Community~~ fold.

9. Elsewhere, Japan, like Western Europe, will move further away from its close association with the US and should become a factor

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of even greater consequence in world affairs. It will play an important worldwide economic role, a gradually growing political role in Asia, and a special economic and political role vis-a-vis both China and the USSR. Less powerful states aligned with the US, including Canada, Australia, and several Latin American countries, are likely to become even more self-reliant and disinclined to follow the US lead. At the same time these states will probably become increasingly important to the US as sources of raw materials and potential political support.

C. Turbulence in the Third World

10. The evolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Soviet role in the Middle East, and Arab oil policies will remain major concerns of the US. Specifically, US interest in the Middle East will for some time focus on: the development of a peace settlement; the supply of oil, (on acceptable political terms and at prices the world can afford); and the sale of arms, ^{particularly} in the area, ~~especially~~ by the USSR. ~~The US will also remain concerned about~~ internal political stability, especially in the friendly oil producing countries, *will also remain a major US concern.*

11. The Soviets will complicate Middle East peace negotiations by supporting the more extreme Arab demands, but will probably not seek to sabotage them outright. A gradual increase in the Soviet Naval presence is expected in the Indian Ocean if the Suez Canal reopens, and the Soviets will in that event also be better able to make surge deployments in the

area during local crises. Moscow will continue to use military aid as a means to preserve its influence in the Middle East and South Asia--perhaps compensating for a loss of influence in one area (e.g., Egypt) by emphasizing activities and programs in another (e.g., Syria)--and will in some areas press for access to naval and air support facilities.

12. It is unlikely that the fighting in Southeast Asia will cease before 1980, if then. All countries in the area face ongoing or latent insurgencies. It is by no means certain that the forces of the incumbent governments of South Vietnam, Thailand, and the Philippines will be ~~beaten in battle~~ *(beaten in battle)* *at the hands of the insurgents* but their defeat in any one of these countries, should it come to pass, could have serious consequences for US interests. Elsewhere in the Third World, the large non-aligned countries, such as India and Indonesia, and the strategically located states, such as Somalia and Singapore, will continue to attract Soviet interest and, where Moscow finds it feasible, a Soviet presence. Competition in these areas with the US and in some instances China will persist and perhaps grow.

13. South Asia, Latin America, and southern Africa are all areas where instability and the forces of nationalism could impinge on US interests. In South Asia, the situation in Pakistan and the relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan remain unsettled. India and

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Bangladesh are both entering a period of intensified domestic political turbulence, of the sort which might lead to international complications. In Latin America, the USSR's presence in the Caribbean and its influence in Peru and, in general, the emergence of increasingly self-assertive and nationalistic regimes will continue to pose problems for the US. The confrontation of black and white-dominated states in southern Africa could jeopardize US economic interests and ~~greatly~~ complicate aspects of US policy in Africa and Europe.

14. The problem of nuclear proliferation is likely to increase during this decade. By 1980 at least one of three states--Israel, India, and Taiwan--will have openly become a nuclear power and this might encourage other countries to follow suit. The option will be available to West Germany, Japan, Brazil, Argentina, and South Africa. Beyond this, fissile materials for a few nuclear weapons probably will be available to any country or organization willing to purchase them from illicit sources.

D. Emerging Worldwide Problems

15. Other emerging international problems ~~such as the~~ ^{rising} world-wide rate of inflation, the pace of technological change, and the political implications of both ~~and~~ fresh perceptions of some old problems ~~such as the availability of vital natural resources, food supply, and the overall impact of environmental pollution~~ will probably demand more attention from the intelligence community as the decade progresses. Certain

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specific developments ^{-- among them} including the growth of the multinational corporation, the potential for extracting resources from the seas, the pressures of worldwide population growth, and the increasing willingness of small countries with enormous resource wealth to challenge the economic practices and positions of much larger and stronger states. ~~It will obviously~~ affect US world interests in unfamiliar and uncertain, though consequential, ways. Finally, a quite different sort of development seems more and more likely to have repercussions of international import. All over the world, and in all types of societies, there is a growing tendency among ethnic and discrete cultural groups to demand, often violently, that their institutions and aspirations be accorded special recognition; this is a tendency which could easily become more disruptive as the decade progresses.

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B. Economic Intelligence

Economic intelligence is harder to define, more fluid, and the need for it less predictable than is the case for other types of intelligence. As international economic affairs have become increasingly important to U.S. policymakers perceptions of the demands for the collection, analysis and evaluation of economic information have broadened, to encompass all foreign economic developments having a substantial effect on U.S. national interests. While economic intelligence can include almost any kind of foreign economic information, the focus of attention within the Intelligence Community will be on analysis and evaluation specifically related to US policy concerns. Open sources and overt reporting will provide the primary data, and special intelligence collection undertaken only when open source data is inadequate and there is a clear need supported by consumer requirements.

Some of the requirements for economic support will be reasonably stable -- for example, economic research on denied areas -- but others will change as a result of changing world market conditions and policy concerns. Even so, the priority of certain important elements of economic intelligence needs can be forecasted.

Over the coming five years, as indicated in the DCID 1/2 Attachment, the economic intelligence topic of continuing highest priority will be the dynamics of economic policy formulation in [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Also very high on the priority list will be trade policies, the balance of payments adjustment process and international monetary reform activities of these same countries.

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C. Military Intelligence

As the only country capable of putting the physical survival of the United States at risk, the Soviet Union will continue to be the focus of the highest priorities assigned to the collection and analysis of military intelligence throughout the 1975-1979 period. Much of this intelligence will directly relate to Soviet planning for and deployment of forces to which the SALT arrangements apply.

Military intelligence on Chinese Communist forces will be next in order of importance, with third place going to the major Eastern European countries of the Warsaw Pact -- Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Poland. Continued presence of U.S. forces in Korea will give military intelligence on North Korea high importance, but somewhat less than that accorded to the forward area of the Warsaw Pact, where U.S. interest in MBFR developments and the requirement to monitor compliance with any MBFR agreement is expected to remain high.

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D. Science and Technology

As is true now and has been for the past two decades, the Soviet Union will by all odds be the most important U.S. target for scientific and technical intelligence in the 1975-1979 period. Soviet RDT&E on military systems and its programs in basic science and applied technology are seen as more important to U.S. interests than such activities in any other country, and the USSR shares top priority importance with the PRC in nuclear science and technology.

The Peoples Republic of China will be clearly the second most important target for scientific and technical intelligence activities.

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III. THE INTELLIGENCE IMPERATIVES

1. The environment within which foreign intelligence activities of the United States will be conducted and the priorities which apply to the various intelligence needs have been described in Parts I and II. Given these longer range perspectives, the question is how they will impact on Intelligence Community planning, methods of analysis, allocation of resources, and managerial attentions. Designing the responses calls for continuing attention to identification of changing consumer needs and to the means and methods by which intelligence analysis is conducted and the intelligence product communicated as an input to the decision-making equation. This involves both an accurate awareness of changing world patterns and interdependencies as described in this paper and the decision processes used by those intelligence serves.

2. This section, therefore, presents in as specific a manner as possible planning guidance applicable to collection, processing, analysis and production on the major substantive problem areas with which the Intelligence Community must deal over the next several years.

A. Strategic Intelligence on the Great Powers


3. US information on the Great Powers' strategic posture has advanced considerably with the advent of an

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
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array of expensive and highly technical collection systems. But there are still many uncertainties about the technical, military, economic, and political programs, plans and intentions of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. The Intelligence Community will have a continuing task of reducing these uncertainties so as to buttress the objectives of SALT and MBFR negotiations to achieve an acceptable stabilization. The equation in this balance will depend on the reliability and timeliness of intelligence monitoring.


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5. In the collection field, the Community must:

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6. Processing. Processing and exploiting information acquired by technical sensors on Soviet and PRC targets poses two problems which need a heavy dose of management attention: (1) Improvement of techniques for gleaning from the mass of potentially useful data that which is actually needed by intelligence analysts; and, (2) better means of assuring that the processed output is in a format which enhances its utility to the analysts. Increased attention needs to be paid to technical processing capabilities in order to enhance the usefulness of the processed output both to analysts and to intelligence consumers.

7. To cope with processing problems which it faces, the Community must:

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8. Analysis. New methods of analyzing both technical data and information obtained through more traditional reporting methods will be of critical importance to effective utilization of the information which is likely to be available to analysts concerned with the USSR and the PRC. Assessment of the data needed to keep the United States abreast of what the USSR and the PRC are accomplishing at the frontiers of technology -- particularly as such research relates to development of new or improved strategic capabilities -- is one of the more important analytical tasks of the Intelligence Community.

9. To improve the quality and sophistication of its analysts, the Intelligence Community must:


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
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10. Production. The production of finished intelligence must relate directly to identified consumer requirements. The better the collection and processing of data and the better the analytical effort the better can the final product be -- provided it is closely geared to what the consumer needs at that particular time. The problem of production offices, therefore, is to insure that they are: (1) capable of making optimum use of information which collectors and processors make available; and (2) sensitive to consumer needs so as to insure that intelligence is produced on such subjects and at such times as to insure maximum utility of the product to the decision-making process.

11. Specific production outputs cannot be pre-planned very far into the future in a changing world situation, so a capability for flexibility in the application of production resources is highly important. To enhance the effectiveness of products relating to the USSR and the PRC production organizations must:

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14. To enable the US to acquire the information it needs:

a. INR/State and CIA must carefully identify those political intelligence needs which can be met only by a SIGINT effort or clandestine operations as guidance for NSA and CIA collection.

b. The USIB Economic Intelligence Committee should take the lead in working out with involved State, Treasury, Commerce and Agricultural Department

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agencies, in particular, arrangements which will insure a properly coordinated effort to acquire the economic data needed by the United States.

INSERT OTHER SPECIFIC PLANNING GUIDANCE AS DEVELOPED IN CONFERENCE

15. Processing. Serious technical processing problems are not expected to be encountered in the handling of information relating to the major non-Communist countries, with the possible exception of the SIGINT field. To cope with such SIGINT problems:

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16. Analysis. The volume of overtly available information and the need to exploit selectively only that data which is of significance will be the primary problem confronting analysts. To insure a high quality of effort, the following is indicated:

a. Production organizations should develop analysts with a view to motivating them to make a career of their speciality. Key cadres are going to be needed, even though they may include only a few personnel, who know individual key countries in great depth. The Community must be able to turn to selected analysts with confidence that they can deal with recognized authority on matters which relate to the country on which they have specialized. These cadres of analytical specialists must be capable of providing sophisticated estimates and forecasts, with increased attention to non-military categories of intelligence.

INSERT OTHER PLANNING GUIDANCE AS DEVELOPED IN CONFERENCES

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17. Production. Increasing requirements can be expected for products specifically oriented toward providing intelligence to support US positions in international conferences, particularly those dealing with trade policies, international monetary arrangements, defense alliances, and the Law of the Sea. Close liaison with high level consumers so as to insure early identification of product needs, and emphasis on the development of analysts who have expertise in depth on these topics should enhance the performance of intelligence production organizations in meeting these requirements.

C. Reaction to Crises

18. The needs for intelligence on the undeveloped countries and on those countries just now moving into the industrial world relate in large measure to anticipation of crises which will affect basic US security and policy interests.



III-9

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19. Considerable attention is being devoted in the Department of Defense to improving US capabilities for security posture management on a worldwide basis, and because of the Intelligence Community's responsibilities for the provision of warning, it must work intimately with the agencies which deal directly with posture management problems.


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21. Processing. The primary problems which may arise in the processing portion of the cycle arise from the fact that data relevant to the early stages of a developing crisis may appear on communications links to which SIGINT collectors do not give high processing priority. To reduce the risk of this occurring:

INSERT PLANNING GUIDANCE DEVELOPED IN CONFERENCES

22. Analysis. Analytical competence in the anticipation of crisis situations and during the actual crisis depends both on the availability of analyst cadres steeped in the factors which bear on the situation and on their access to all pertinent information on a timely basis. Automated and integrated data support for analysts is particularly important in crisis periods because of the compression of time for reaction. The Intelligence Community must keep abreast of the state-of-the-art in this field.

a. All major production organizations should insure the availability of specialized cadres of analysts thoroughly familiar with the situation in areas where crises of import to the United States may occur.

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
b. The R&D Advisory Council of the IRAC should advise the Intelligence Community as to state-of-the-art technology in automated data support which may be particularly applicable to the support of analysts in crisis situations.

c. The USIB Information Handling Committee should investigate means whereby the information flow into and out of Warning and Indications Centers can be improved.

OTHER PLANNING GUIDANCE AS DEVELOPED BY CONFERENCES

23. Production. Production related to response to crisis situations must maintain immediate currency in reporting factual developments and also provide intelligence users with current analyses of the situation. This requires an operating environment which is geared to rapid output of reports and to fast coordination of analyst comments. In support of such capabilities:

a. The Intelligence Community must cooperate fully in support of programs underway to use secure communications nets as a means of speeding the production of coordinated factual bulletins and timely analyses.

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b. Production organizations must be mindful that while open media can compete, in many instances, with the Intelligence Community in factual reporting, the Community has a unique responsibility for interpretation, and continuing attention is needed during crisis situations to insure a flow of interpretative analyses to high level users of intelligence.

OTHER PLANNING GUIDANCE AS DEVELOPED IN CONFERENCES

D. Emerging Worldwide Problems

24. The new intelligence problems now calling for increased intelligence collection and analytical attention tend to be worldwide in nature - the availability of and trade in scarce natural resources, crop prospects, environmental data, Law of the Sea matters, illicit narcotics traffic, anti-US terrorism, etc.

25. The basic problems here are twofold: First, developing a capability for selective acquisition of the needed information, much of which is available through overt


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sources but much, also, calling for selective application of SIGINT, imagery and clandestine activities; and, second, building cadres of key specialists with the expertise needed for meaningful analysis.


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27. Processing. No processing difficulties unique to the emerging worldwide intelligence problems currently are foreseen.

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28. Analysis. The growing requirement for specialists of recognized authority in relatively narrow intelligence fields is nowhere more important than in the analysis of the problems the Intelligence Community faces in a number of new fields. In terms of the overall intelligence effort, the emerging new problems probably will not require the application of large amounts of intelligence resources, but the need for cadres of true experts in each of the emerging problem areas call for selective recruitment and specialized training efforts.

a. All major production organizations must give attention to selective recruitment of analysts whose training and background is such as to strengthen their capabilities to cope with problems in these new areas of interest -- particularly in the field of natural resources, environmental problems, international trade and international monetary arrangements.

INSERT OTHER PLANNING GUIDANCE DEVELOPED IN CONFERENCES

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29. Production. If adequate care is taken to assure the availability of analytical expertise on key elements of the kinds of worldwide intelligence problems which are now emerging, no unusual production difficulties are anticipated. Customers of the finished products will have widely varying needs, however, and continuing effort will be required to maintain the liaison with users which will be necessary to ensure that the products are directly responsive to policy needs for intelligence inputs.

E. Conclusion

30. The actions considered necessary to respond to anticipated future requirements have been identified. Within the major elements of the Intelligence Community approaches now need to be defined and related both to new investment and to personnel recruitment and training needs so that the necessary resource adjustments can be projected.

31. Problems of the scope and variety of those which have been described involve all management levels, but planning to accomplish the actions indicated should begin with establishment by senior managers of well-defined objectives and the means needed to measure performance against those objectives. Such performance yardsticks should include the use of meaningful evaluation systems to measure the cost effectiveness of particular intelligence activities.

III-16